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Abstract:  One of the policy reforms promoted by the World Bank in recent decades is to reduce
the often burdensome level of regulation by developing country governments and thus promote a
reorientation from highly regulated and centrally controlled to deregulated and market-based
economies.  Indeed, poor growth performance and balance of payments problems on their own
might well necessitate this transformation.  Does World Bank lending promote deregulation with
stronger incentives and critical resources (finance and advice) or slow the process by blunting the
impact of crises and indirectly promoting state control via development planning and government
sponsored projects?  This paper analyzes empirical links between aid flows and regulatory
burden.  Econometric estimates based on panel data for 83 aid receiving countries from 1970 to
2000 find that World Bank lending, while not specifically targeting high or low regulatory states,
is linked to lower subsequent regulation.  This link holds for multilateral donors more broadly
while bilateral donor funds apparently fail to influence the level of regulation.
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1The measure of World Bank lending is gross disbursements from IDA credits, IBRD loans and
IFC loans.  Debates of the relative merits of commitment versus disbursement data are mute in this case
as the OECD DAC does not give historical data on IBRD commitments.
I.  Introduction
Since at least the mid 1970s, a high priority of the World Bank and many other donors
has been to induce LDC governments to transform their economies from highly regulated and
centrally controlled to deregulated and market-based.  But even without donor intervention, poor
growth performance and balance of payments problems on their own might necessitate this
transition.  Has World Bank lending promoted deregulation with stronger incentives and critical
resources (finance and advice) or slowed the process by blunting the impact of crises and
indirectly promoting state control via development planning and government sponsored projects?
This paper addresses this question through an empirical analysis of aid flows and
regulatory burden. Aid allocation and regulation equations are estimated using panel data on 83
aid receiving countries from 1970 to 2000.  The measure of regulation is a component of the
Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom in the World” series.  The estimated World Bank loan
allocation equation reveals that, ceteris paribus, the flow of World Bank funds is not determined
by the level of regulation in recipient countries.1  The estimated regulation equation suggests
effective World Bank conditionality: World Bank lending apparently lowers regulation.  This
holds for multilateral donors more broadly.  Conversely, bilateral donor funds fail to influence
the level of regulation.  The contrast between these results and the dominant criticism of World
Bank conditionality more broadly may be explained by the level of aggregation.  In analyses that
examine only a single, broad measure of policy, the response to one component may mask the
response to another component. The findings in this paper point to the importance of a more
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disaggregate analysis of the interaction of aid and policy in developing countries, differentiating
between different donors and different dimensions of policy.
Section II reviews previous research, focusing on empirical studies of aid, regulation and
related topics.  Section III presents the data and model to be estimated.  Section IV discusses
results and Section V concludes.
II.  Previous Research
Donor agencies, led by the World Bank, have long attempted to promote policy reform
through structural adjustment packages.  Since there is almost universal agreement that lasting
reforms can only come from within, what role does external funding play?  Traditional World
Bank and IMF arguments in favor of adjustment assistance focus on economic dynamics.  Timely
World Bank loans may minimize the negative short-run effects of policy reform, help channel
productive resources out of contracting sectors and into expanding sectors, and fund one-time
expenses associated with privatization of state-owned enterprises.  World Bank funds promote
macroeconomic stability and thus spur private investment in emerging areas of comparative
advantage facilitating the critical supply response.  The World Bank may also provide technical
assistance for deregulation.  Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has added “social aspects of
structural adjustment” to the list of donor concerns.
More recently, researchers both inside and outside aid institutions have emphasized
political aspects of the reform process as well.  From a political economy perspective, putting
resources in the hands of committed reformers allows them to distribute benefits and thus “buy
support” for reforms.  Benefits may include delaying enforcement of tax laws, providing
transitional funding to former government employees, compensating commercial interests hurt by
trade liberalization, and prolonging popular price controls on such items as food and fuel
2Svensson (2000B) actually uses this argument to explain why an altruistic donor government
might delegate to a less altruistic international agency, e.g., the World Bank.  Hagen (2004) points out
that Svensson’s analysis is a partial explanation, more applicable to some donors (e.g., the
Scandinavians) than to others (e.g., the U.S. and France) and introduces a second dimension of recipient
heterogeneity:  aid productivity.  In either model, time inconsistency due to altruism may lead to
unenforced conditionality.  Collier (1997) takes the argument a step further, suggesting that recipient
governments will undermine growth intentionally if donors follow need-based allocation.
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(Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Blanchard, 1996; Fleck, 2000; Rodrik, 1996).  Access to World Bank
loans is critical to provide such resources since, in the midst of such crises, the recipient
government cannot access commercial credit.
However, much recent research finds structural adjustment lending an ineffective tool for
a number of reasons.  The World Bank is often reluctant to enforce conditions attached to its
loans and credits (Mosley et al., 1995) at least in part because of institutional incentives to
continue lending regardless of outcomes, the so-called “pressure to lend.”  A more charitable
explanation is found in the classic Samaritan’s Dilemma.  For a sufficiently altruistic donor,
giving aid is a dominant strategy.  Thus, donor conditions are not credible and do not impact
recipient governments’ reform decisions (Svensson, 2000B).2  A less sympathetic critique
emphasizes donor interests rather than altruism.  Defensive lending and promotion of donor
economic and strategic interests may create an imperative to dispense aid even in a multilateral
agency (Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Mosley et al., 1995; Svensson, 2003; Tendler, 1975; Villanger,
2004).
Donor involvement may even work against reform (Boockmann and Dreher, 2003).  If
policy choices are the outcome of a political process balancing competing interests, difficult
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reforms may only take place in time of crisis once the status quo no longer is viable.  World Bank
loans–providing hard currency and a degree of debt relief–postpone the crisis and hence may
facilitate postponing or watering down reform.  If the World Bank fails to enforce its reform
conditions, it will delay policy change.
These issues are critical for the debate over aid effectiveness in promoting growth and
reducing poverty.  A number of studies find that aid is only effective in good policy
environments (Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; World Bank, 1998).  This poses a number of
questions.  If aid cannot induce policy change–as Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD)
suggest–then aid directed at poor policy environments is doubly ineffective:  it fails to promote
growth directly because the policy environment is poor and it fails to promote growth indirectly
by changing the policy environment to a pro-growth one.  Thus, if growth is a necessary
condition for aid to achieve its goals, aid should be allocated selectively to countries which
already have good policy environments (Collier, 1997; Collier and Dollar, 2001).  Conversely, if
aid can induce policy change, then even aid to countries with poor policies will promote growth
albeit indirectly.  In this case, the appropriate allocation of aid depends on relative impact and
need (balancing between aid to poor policy environments to promote change, aid to good policy
environments to directly promote growth, and aid to those most in need since there is some
impact–direct or indirect–in all settings).
While the World Bank, the U.S. administration and many other donors have recently
embraced the selective approach to aid allocation, there has been a strong response from the
academic community.  Critiques have used a variety of approaches; the most compelling are
empirical studies that demonstrate BD’s results are not robust to changes in sample or
specification (Clemens et al., 2004; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004;
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Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 2001; Roodman, 2004).  At a minimum, the empirical foundation of the
selective approach to aid allocation seems too fragile to justify this major shift in donor policy
(Easterly et al., 2004).
In light of this debate, attention has recently turned to whether aid facilitates specific
types of reform.  According to Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003, 1528), “although the literature on
the effects of foreign aid on economic growth and development is large and growing, analysis of
its impacts on economic reforms in general, and on specific reform policies such as privatization,
is still nascent.”  Below, I review five areas of research on aid and policy that are important for
this study:  aid and government size (Remmer, 2004); aid and privatization (Banerjee and
Rondinelli, 2003); aid and corruption (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Tavares, 2003; and Svensson,
2000A); aid and foreign investment (Harms and Lutz, 2003); and aid and regulation (Kilby,
2005).  All are empirical studies that provide guidance for the current work.
Remmer (2004) studies how government size (the ratio of government expenditures to
GDP) relates to aid flows.  Shrinking third world governments is a common donor objective
especially since the debt crisis and the advent of the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson,
1990, 2003).  Yet aid could easily have the opposite effect:
...the notion that augmenting the resources of a government from outside may
reduce or have no systematic effect on government size is intrinsically
implausible.  The reason is that the political costs and benefits of expenditures
financed by external resources and those funded by domestic taxation or revenue
generation differ significantly.  (Remmer, 2004, 80)
This is particularly true if aid conditions are only weakly enforced. Remmer also suggests that
countries dependent on aid may expect to leverage fiscal deficits into more future aid.  Using
3Remmer also controls for openness, demographics, GDP per capita, debt service ratio, and
government revenue as a share of GDP.
4Interpreting Banerjee and Rondinelli’s individual estimates is difficult.  The paper presents a
very large number of estimates, not all of which are consistent with a single interpretation.  The negative
binomial specification for pace requires the strong assumption that each privatization is an independent
event.  Finally, pace and intensity are not measured relative to the size of the economy.
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panel data (1970-1999 for 120 nations) on government size, tax effort and aid, Remmer estimates
error-correction models for government spending and tax effort that show aid is associated with
increased public spending and decreased tax effort.3   These results are consistent with BD and
Devarajan et al. (2001).
Banerjee and Rondinelli (2003) examine the link between aid and privatization.  Their
study examines the impact of aid on the timing, pace and intensity of privatization in a group of
35 developing countries.  They define timing as when the first privatization takes place, pace as
the number of privatizations in a given year and intensity as the value (in constant dollars) of
privatizations in a year.  Again, aid can play a positive or negative role:  aid provides leverage to
promote privatization in aid dependent countries but these funds also have the potential to inhibit
privatization by directly or indirectly subsidizing money-losing SOEs.  As BD and Alesina and
Dollar (2000) find for other policies, Banerjee and Rondinelli cannot reject aid exogeneity, i.e.,
that aid allocation does not depend on privatization.  The authors take several lessons away from
this empirical exercise.  The role of aid is limited primarily to technical assistance supporting
ongoing privatizations but for countries with “superior governance structures” aid may play a
larger role (Banerjee and Rondinelli, 2003, 1546).  The estimates suggest that aid does not have a
systematic effect on the start of privatization.4
5See for example Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Diamond (1997), Easterly and Levine (2003),
Fleck and Hanssen (2003), Rodrik et al. (2002), Sachs (2003).
6The ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable is for 1960 and “measures the probability that two
randomly selected people in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups” (449).
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Several empirical studies look at the impact of aid on corruption using aggregate cross-
country data.  Alesina and Weder (2002) provide evidence of Lane and Tornell’s (1996)
“voracity effect” (aid causing increased corruption) but note that they do not substantially address
potential endogeneity (corruption attracting aid).  Tavares (2003) addresses this using cultural
and geographical proximity between donors and recipients as instruments for aid, finding aid
reduces corruption.  While Tavares’ two stage method is undoubtably right, even his imaginative
instruments may not be exogenous.  The recent literature on colonization, institutions and growth
links a similar set of indicators to institutional quality and thus to corruption.5
Svensson (2000A) develops and tests a model relating corruption and social divisions
using ethnolinguistic fractionalization to measure the latter.  As Svensson points out, regulation
that restricts competition generates rents, competition for which results in corruption.  This even
may be the regulator’s intent.  Because of the link between regulation and corruption, Svensson
estimates an equation for regulation and aid as a robustness check.  To allow for endogeneity,
Svensson uses population to instrument aid.  The regression includes ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, windfalls as measured by aid plus terms of trade shocks, log of initial real per
capita GDP, regional dummies and time dummies.6  For our purposes, Svensson’s key result is
that windfalls increase regulation, more so in divided societies.  One would expect similar results
using aid separately.
Harms and Lutz (2003) examine how the institutional environment in the recipient
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country influences the link between aid and private foreign investment.  They find that aid is
linked to higher levels of private foreign investment in more highly regulated economies.  This
appears to contradict the central theme of BD and Assessing Aid that aid effectiveness is
conditional on good policy.  The measure of regulation is taken from Kaufmann et al. (1999);
they use a single measure across the decade examined, assuming that regulatory change is
gradual.  Using the same instruments as BD, Harms and Lutz also cannot reject the exogeneity of
aid in the investment equation.  The authors explain their results by suggesting aid can help
foreign investors negotiate the regulatory system and that the importance of this function
increases with the degree of regulation.
Finally, Kilby (2005) examines links between overall aid and regulation, estimating
separate aid allocation and regulation equations.  As in Svensson (2000A), the measure of
regulation is the Fraser Institute’s “Freedom from Government Regulation” index.  The measure
of aid is effective development assistance disbursements from all donors as a percent of real GDP
per capita (both in constant 1996 dollars), the same measure used in BD, Easterly et al (2004),
and Roodman (2004).  Instrumenting for regulation with ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
membership in the Central African Franc Zone, and lagged arms imports in the aid allocation
equation indicates that, ceteris paribus, more aid goes to countries with more regulation. 
Instrumenting for aid with population in the regulation equation reveals that, ceteris paribus,
more aid leads to less regulation.  Thus, at the aggregate level, the results suggest effective
conditionality.  This result is somewhat at odds with the broader literature on the ineffectiveness
of conditionality but in line with Harms and Lutz (2003).
Thus, the literature provides substantial guidance for empirical work on issues of aid and
regulation.  Although many studies find that aid allocation is not guided by the policy
7Regarding arms imports, they state:  “To capture strategic interests we also use a measure of
arms imports relative to total imports lagged one period. This variable helps explain the allocation of aid
to middle-income countries, but has only minor relevance in the low-income country data set” (BD, 26-
7).
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environment in recipient countries, empirical studies must continue to test for potential
endogeneity.  Donors could consider the level of regulation in aid allocation in a number of ways. 
Ex post conditionality (selectivity) implies allocating more aid to countries with less regulated
economies.  Conversely, there could be a bias toward highly regulated economies if the woes of
excess regulation result in greater need or if donors hope to “buy reform” (deregulation) through
ex ante conditionality as in traditional structural adjustment.  Likewise, aid may influence the
level of regulation.  Although empirical evidence of endogeneity is mixed, we must examine
these issues.
Looking across the previous literature, a number of instruments for regulation and aid
present themselves. BD estimate an aid allocation equation (BD’s Table 8) which includes
variables intended to reflect donors’ economic and strategic motives.  Some of these prove
insignificant including membership in the West African Franc Zone (so called CFA countries)
and arms imports as a share of overall imports.7  The first is intended to measure links to France
while the second may reflect alliances with donors such as the United States and its close allies;
both are expected to result in more aid but prove insignificant.  However, even if these are
unrelated to aid allocation, there is reason to suppose they could be related to the level of
regulation.  Particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, CFA countries experienced severe
macroeconomic problems because of exchange rate misalignment.  Governments in CFA
countries may attempt to counteract resulting imbalances via regulation.  A high value for arms
8Interestingly, these variables are included in BD’s aid allocation equation because they view
them as exogenous to growth.
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imports as a share of total imports suggests a repressive regime, one likely associated with
widespread corruption and regulation.  The mechanism for this may follow Svensson’s
description of a highly divided society (a similar story as for ethnolinguistic fractionalization) or
may simply be the result of the approach of a repressive regime.8  In short, BD show these are
unrelated to aid allocation while Svensson’s work suggests they (and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization) may be linked to kleptocracy and hence to corruption and regulatory burden.
Svensson also provides an instrument for aid, namely population.  Research on aid
allocation has long shown a bias against large countries; with aid as a share of GDP, this appears
as a negative coefficient on population (e.g., BD; Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  If bilateral donors
want to have programs in many countries (for example, to influence UN voting), they will under
fund populous recipients to stretch their budgets while over funding very small recipients to
justify fixed administrative costs of a country program.  In the case of multilateral lending
agencies such as the World Bank, limiting lending to populous recipients also limits their
importance in terms of the lending pipeline and repayments, and thus prevents them from
exercising leverage over the multilateral.
However, the disaggregated approach in this study poses new hurdles.  While looking at
World Bank lending, it is necessary to account for other aid as well.  The regulation equation
includes two aid variables, World Bank lending and other aid, and thus at least one unique
instrument is needed for each to identify their effects separately.  Finding such measures is not
9For example, we might attempt to exploit bureaucratic features of the World Bank.  “Blend”
countries receive both IDA and IBRD funds, ostensibly because they are in transition from one to the
other.  Estimates reveal that, ceteris paribus, blend countries receive less IDA funding than other IDA
countries but the same IBRD funding as other IBRD countries and thus receive more funds altogether. 
However, these countries also receive more bilateral aid.  Variations due to apparent institution-specific
features (in this case, which countries are allowed access to both funds) may in fact reflect donor
preferences and thus influence bilateral aid as well.
10Gwartney et al. (2003). This is the same measure used by Svensson (2000A) and Kilby (2005). 
In the Fraser Institute’s documentation, this rating is called “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.”
11Other available measures of regulation (e.g., the Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation
regulation variable and an index developed by Kaufmann et al. [2003]) provide only very short time
11
straightforward.9  In this paper, I rely on lagged values of the variables themselves and of
repayments.
 III.  Data and Model
I draw on four existing data sets to examine the links between aid and regulation.  The
primary measure of regulation comes from the Fraser Institute and is an aggregate measure of
“Freedom from Government Regulation” (FGR).10  The variable can range from 0 (low freedom
from government regulation = high regulation) to 10 (high freedom from government regulation
= low regulation) and is available for 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2001
though not all years are available for all countries.  This is one of five components averaged
together to generate the Fraser Institute’s “Economic Freedom of the World” index.  FGR is
itself an aggregate of fifteen sub-indices, five each related to credit market regulation, labor
market regulation, and business regulation.11
series.
12The threshold for ODA is 35% in the case of mixed credits, e.g., where concessional finance
funds are packaged with a commercial contract.  While there is some debate about the relative merits of
EDA in analyzing growth, it seems a reasonable measure when considering issues of conditionality.
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Several different measures of aid are available.  Much of the work cited above (BD;
Easterly et. al., 2004; Roodman, 2004; Kilby, 2005) uses Effective Development Assistance
(EDA) developed by Chang et al. (1998).  While the standard measure of aid (Official
Development Assistance or ODA) lumps concessional loans together with grants if the loan’s
grant element exceeds 25%, EDA converts these loans to their grant equivalent and thus provides
a better measure of long term resource flows.12  However, EDA and ODA are highly correlated
and research results thus far do not depend on which measure is used (e.g., BD).  Chang et al.’s
(1998) publically available data set provides bilateral and multilateral EDA but does not
otherwise differentiate between donors.  Given these considerations, the analysis in this paper
primarily uses conventional aid measures, i.e., five year averages from the OECD DAC’s 2004
data base for World Bank gross disbursements (WBAIDit) and all other official gross
disbursements excluding the World Bank (AIDit).  I also construct variables reflecting repayment
of past loans (WBrepayit and AIDrepayit, the difference between gross and net disbursements).   
The auxiliary analysis in Table 4 compares results for bilateral and multilateral aid using
conventional data (BAIDit and MAIDit) and EDA data (BEDAit and MEDAit).  All are given as a
percentage of real GDP to reflect the relative importance of aid to the recipient government.  I
use the natural log of period averages throughout.
The remaining variables come from the data set (five year averages) posted by Roodman
(2004), an extension of data and work done by Easterly et al. (2004). Several regional and
13More accurately, defensive lending or granting in the case of bilateral institutions.  A donor
may prefer to provide more new funds to facilitate repayment of old debts.
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country dummy variables are included:  Sub Saharan Africa (SSAi), East Asia (EASIAi), Central
America (CENTAMi), EGYPTi, and ISRAELi.  In addition, I include the log per capita GDP (in
constant dollars) at the start of each period (GDP_CAPit) and the log of population (POPit). 
Finally, three variables previously discussed are an indicator for CFA countries (CFAi), imports
of military equipment as a share of total imports lagged by one period (ARMSit!1), and an index
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1960 (ETHNICi).
The regulation variable is measured at five year intervals that fall at the start of the
averaged five year period for the other data.  For this reason, I lagged the other variables in the
aid allocation equations.  The basic specifications for recipient country i in period t are




Equation (1) is the allocation equation for non-World Bank aid.  AIDit is the aid the
country received from all donors except the World Bank given as a share of the country’s real
GDP.  The equation includes FGRit since aid may be conditional on regulation as discussed
above.  WBAIDit enters because the World Bank may act as a coordinator–other donors may
follow its lead in giving aid.  I include lagged aid and aid loan repayment (AIDit!1 and
AIDrepayit!1) as the former may reflect omitted factors or inertia in donor behavior (especially
when looking at disbursements) while the latter may capture defensive lending/granting.13 
14The short length of the time series (maximum 7 periods, median 4 periods) prevents a
meaningful exploration of the time series characteristics of the data even with relatively strong
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GDP_CAPit may reflect need while including POPit allows for the bias against large countries. 
The equation includes ARMSit!1 to reflect strategic importance (e.g., alliances) which may be
important since this equation includes bilateral aid.  Geographic dummies (including for Israel
and Egypt) may also capture strategic importance and historical alignments.
Equation (2) is the World Bank allocation equation.  WBAIDit is the amount of funds (in
constant dollars) the recipient received from the World Bank Group (IDA, IBRD, and IFC) given
as a share of the country’s real GDP.  The equation includes FGRit since World Bank lending
may be conditional on the level of regulation.  AIDit enters because the World Bank may at times
follow the lead of other donors.  I include lagged lending and loan repayment (WBAIDit!1 and
WBrepayit!1) again to capture omitted factors, institutional inertia, and defensive lending.  As
above GDP_CAPit may reflect need and POPit allows for a size bias.  The equation excludes
ARMSit!1 and the dummy for Israel as multilateral lending is not as directly strategic as bilateral
aid (especially that from the U.S.).  I test this exclusion restriction below.  Both FGRit and AIDit
may be endogenous in this equation.  The focus of this equation is on the coefficient for FGRit.
Equation (3) is the regulation equation.  FGRit is the Fraser Institute’s “freedom from
government regulation” index.  Higher values indicate less regulation; hence a positive
coefficient on an explanatory variable indicates that it is associated with less regulation.  The
equation includes AIDit!1 and WBAIDit!1 since either may influence the level of regulation if aid
conditionality is effective.  The lagged value of the dependent variable (FGRit!1) allows for
persistence over time which the coefficient on GDP_CAPit!1 might otherwise reflect.14 
assumptions across countries in the panel (e.g., Levin et al., 2002).
15This statement is a bit too strong since expectations about regulation during the period could
certainly influence income.
16Because the influence and identification of outliers in this data has been controversial (Easterly
et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004), application of Hadi’s method is becoming standard.
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GDP_CAPit!1 is the initial value at the start of period t!1 so that it could not be influenced
directly by current regulation (FGRit).15  GDP_CAPit!1 is likely to enter positively though the
direction of causation is controversial.  Much of the research on the indices produced by the
Fraser Institute has focused on how these various aspects of “Economic Freedom” may promote
growth and hence be linked indirectly to higher incomes.  However, when considering income
itself, it is also plausible that “Economic Freedom” is a normal good, the consumption of which
rises with income (Hanson 2003).   Svensson (2000A) presents an argument for ETHNICi
entering negatively; by extension, ARMSit!1 and CFAi should also enter negatively.  Other
interpretations of these variables are possible but also suggest a link with more rather than less
regulation (i.e., lower values of FGRit).  Finally, the various geographic variables may capture
broadly different patterns of regulation across regions not already captured by the other
explanatory variables.  Both AIDit!1 and WBAIDit!1 may be endogenous in this equation.  Their
coefficients are the key points of interest in this equation.
The sample covers 83 countries over five year periods from 1970 to 2000 although not all
periods are available for all countries.  The largest sample possible for any of the regressions is
407.  In the aid allocation equations, the sample is reduced to 376 to allow for lagged values and
further reduced to 367 to exclude outliers identified by Hadi’s (1994) method.16  This sample
includes 80 countries with an average of 4.6 periods per country but going as low as 1 and as
17I use the joint test of overidentifying restrictions based on Hansen’s J-statistic (described in
Baum et al., 2003) as well as the individual test outlined in Wooldridge (2003, 508).
18The hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected if the instrument set includes the contemporaneous
repayment variable (WBrepayit).
19In this specification (with lagged World Bank lending included), population no longer enters
significantly on its own.  We can instead use it as an additional instrument for AIDit.
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high as 7.  The initial sample for the regulation equation is 384 but 8 outliers are dropped leaving
376 observations on 74 countries.  In specifications that include the previous period’s regulation
index (FGRit!1), the sample falls to 310 observations on 74 countries.
The appendix provides details on the data used.  Table A1 lists countries and coverage
periods.  Basic descriptive statistics are in Table A2 and simple correlations in Table A3. All
three tables cover the overall sample except where noted.
IV.  Estimation Results
The first step in the empirical analysis is testing the validity of instruments in the case of
over-identifying restrictions.17  In the aid allocation equation (equation 1), I test and fail to reject
as valid instruments lagged regulation (FGRit!1), ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ETHNICi)
and membership in the West African Franc Zone (CFAi) for regulation and lagged World Bank
lending (WBAIDit!1) and lagged World Bank repayment (WBrepayit!1) for World Bank
lending.18  Turning to the World Bank allocation equation (equation 2), I test and fail to reject as
valid instruments FGRit!1, ETHNICi, CFAi, and ARMSit!1 for FGRit and AIDit!1 and
AIDrepayit!1 for AIDit.19  Finally, in the regulation equation (equation 3), I test and fail to reject
as valid instruments AIDit!2, AIDrepayit!2, POPit!1 and ISRAELi for AIDit!1 and WBAIDit!2 for
WBAIDit!1.  However, the individual test does reject the exogeneity of WBrepayit!2 conditional
20The test (Wooldridge, 2003, 507) includes the residual from the reduced form aid equation in
the structural equation for the World Bank (treating regulation as endogenous).  Under the null
hypothesis that aid is exogenous, the residual should not be statistically significant in the latter
estimation.  With a t-statistic of 2.58, the test rejects the exogeneity of aid in the World Bank equation at
the 95% confidence level.  A joint test rejects the exogeneity of aid and regulation while a test treating
aid as endogenous fails to reject the exogeneity of regulation.
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on exogeneity of the other instruments.
The instruments not rejected above allow us to test the endogeneity of WBAIDit and
FGRit in equation (1), AIDit and FGRit in equation (2), and AIDit!1 and WBAIDit!1 in equation
(3).  As is well known, the instrumental variables approach inflates the standard errors of
estimates and should only be used if endogeneity is truly a problem.  The tests fail to reject
exogeneity of the variables in all the equations with one exception.  The test does reject the
exogeneity of AIDit in the World Bank allocation equation.20  Thus, the estimates below use
instruments only in that instance.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 contains estimates for the aid allocation equation that excludes World Bank
funds.   The first column (AID 1) is a simple specification to allow comparison.  Real GDP per
capita enters negatively and significantly so that countries with lower per capita incomes receive
a larger aid GDP share.  With both dependent and independent variables in logs, this is the
estimated elasticity:  ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 0.9%
decrease in aid as a share of GDP.  Equivalently, a 1% increase in GDP is associated with a 1.9%
decrease in the dollar amount of aid.  The negative, significant coefficient population reflects the
often noted bias against large countries; ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in population size is
21Israel accounts for just 2 observations, Egypt 5.  Dropping these from the sample has no impact
on other coefficient estimates.
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associated with a 0.4% decrease in aid as a share of GDP or a 1.3% decrease in the dollar amount
of aid holding GDP rather than GDP per capita constant.  Arms imports (lagged one period, i.e.,
5 years) has a positive and significant link to aid.  This is consistent with the rationale offered by
BD that high arms imports reflect a country’s strategic importance to major donors.  Ceteris
paribus, a 1% increase in the arms imports to total imports ratio is associated with a 3% increase
in the aid to GDP ratio.  Dummy variables for Egypt and Israel are also significant, presumably
driven in large part by the Camp David Accords.21
The second column (AID 2) introduces the regulation index as an explanatory variable. 
The index indicates how “free” an economy is from government regulation so that a higher value
indicates less regulation.  The coefficient estimate on FGR is positive but insignificant indicating
that the level of regulation is not an important determinant in the aid allocation decision.  The
other coefficient estimates are virtually unaffected by the inclusion of FGR.
The third column adds two lagged variables.  The first is the lagged value of the
dependent variable (AIDit!1, i.e., the ratio of aid to GDP for the previous 5 year period).  The
second is the lagged value of aid repayments (AIDrepayit!1), again as a share of recipient GDP. 
The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of 0.61 indicates considerable
persistence across time and, as we would expect, its inclusion substantially reduces the size of
the other coefficient estimates.  It has no effect, however, on the sign or significance of the key
variables.  Notable, the coefficient on regulation continues to be small and insignificant.
The fourth column includes World Bank disbursements as an explanatory variable.  The
22This column estimates a dynamic panels with fixed effects.  Although OLS is known to be
biased in this application, it remains a reasonable approach given the trade-offs faced with other methods. 
These issues are summarized nicely in Falaschetti (2003):  the resulting bias is concentrated in estimated
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable with Monte Carlo studies indicating that the other
parameter estimates (i.e., the parameters of interest here) are no more biased than the estimates from IV,
corrected fixed effects, and GMM methods (e.g., Arellano and Bonds 1991).
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coefficient estimate for World Bank disbursements is positive and significant; an increase of 1%
in the ratio of World Bank disbursements to GDP is associated with a 0.28% increase in other aid
disbursements as a share of GDP.  The pattern for other coefficient estimates remains the same: 
negative and significant coefficients on GDP per capita and population, positive on arms imports
and lagged aid.  The estimated coefficient on regulation is very near zero.
The final column of Table 1 presents fixed effects estimates to account for any time
invariant country specific factors omitted from previous specifications.22  The central results are
the same in this specification:  the level of regulation remains an insignificant determinant of the
level of aid a country receives.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 represents parallel estimates for the allocation of World Bank funds.  As with
other aid funds, the responsiveness of World Bank lending to need is evident in the negative,
significant estimated coefficient on GDP per capita.  A 1% increase in GDP per capita is
associated with a 0.8% decrease in World Bank disbursements as a share of GDP or equivalently
a 1.8% decrease in the dollar amount of World Bank disbursements.  The bias against large
countries is also significant with World Bank lending.  Ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in
population size is associated with a 0.2% decrease in World Bank disbursements as a share of
23Arms imports are not included in the World Bank equation; as expected, it is not a significant
determinant of lending for that organization.
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GDP or a 1% decrease if we hold GDP rather than GDP per capita constant.  The  bias toward
Egypt evident in other aid is reversed for the World Bank with the estimated coefficient for the
Egypt dummy significant and negative.23
Column 2 (WB 2) introduces the regulation index.  As with other aid, World Bank
disbursements do not appear to depend on the level of regulation in the recipient country and the
estimated coefficients on other variables are largely unaffected when regulation is included. 
Column 3 adds the lagged dependent variable (WBAIDit!1) as well as lagged repayments
(WBrepayit!1).  World Bank disbursements exhibit considerably less persistence than seen in
Table 1 for other aid but the impact on other estimates is similar.  The coefficients for GDP per
capita and population shrink somewhat but preserve their sign and significance.  The coefficient
estimate for regulation becomes negative but remains insignificant.
Column 4 of Table 2 adds AIDit.  The coefficient estimate is actually larger than that for
the lagged dependent variable and, once it is included, the apparent population bias in World
Bank lending disappears:  the coefficient on population switches from negative and significant to
positive and insignificant.  The coefficients on WBAIDi,t!1 and GDP_CAPit are substantially
reduced.  The dummy for Israel is now negative and significant indicating that World Bank
lending does not mirror other aid in the case of Israel.  As before, regulation remains
insignificant.
As noted above, test results indicate AIDit is endogenous in the World Bank equation. 
24Population drops from the specification so that it can be added to the list of instruments though
the results are quite similar without this step.
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Column 5 presents instrumental variable estimates.24  The results are entirely comparable to those
discussed above with instrumented AIDit still entering as positive and significant (though now on
par with the lagged dependent variable).  As seen throughout, the level of regulation remains
insignificant.  Column 6 introduces fixed effects which influence the size of some coefficient
estimates but not the general results:  regulation remains insignificant, AIDit and WBAIDit!1
remain positive and significant, GDP per capita remains negative and significant, and population
remains positive and insignificant.  The final column combines these techniques estimating
instrumental variables with fixed effects.  The key difference here is that instrumented AIDit is
not statistically significant.  We would expect to see this result if the instruments were largely
capturing cross country rather than intertemporal variation in aid.  The coefficient on regulation,
though increased somewhat, is again insignificant.  Thus, across all the specifications and
methods examined, World Bank disbursement is not responsive to the regulatory environment in
recipient countries.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 turns to determinants of regulation.  It is important to recall that the dependent
variable, FGRit, is the 0-to-10 “freedom from government regulation” index so that increases
(positive coefficients) correspond to deregulation.  Column 1 (FGR 1) presents a baseline
specification.  One striking result is the strong link between arms imports and regulation with
higher arms imports associated with more regulation.  In all but the final specification, the
25This is true even if we maximize the sample by dropping other variables with limited coverage. 
Given the strength of the relationship, this link deserves further empirical and theoretical exploration.
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estimated coefficient on arms imports is large and highly significant.25  The estimated coefficient
on GDP per capita is positive and significant with a 1% increase in GDP per capita associated
with roughly a 0.3 point increase in the regulation index, indicating that rising GDP per capita is
strongly linked to deregulation.  In contrast to Svensson’s (2000A) findings, the measure of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is positive though insignificant.  Membership in the West
African Franc Zone (CFAi) is marginally significant with the expected negative sign.  Of the
regional dummies, only Central America proves significant.
Column 2 (FGR 2) includes World Bank disbursements.  The estimated coefficient is
positive and significant with a 1% increase in World Bank disbursements as a share of GDP
associated with a 0.2 point increase in FGRit (i.e., 0.2 point reduction in regulation).   The
inclusion of the World Bank variable has a modest impact on the other coefficients.
Column 3 introduces the lagged value of the regulation index to allow for persistence
over time that the coefficient on GDP_CAPit!1 might otherwise reflect.  With the lagged variable,
the first period drops from the sample bringing the number of observations to 310 from 376.  The
highly significant estimated coefficient of 0.66 confirms the inertia of regulation.  The magnitude
of other coefficient falls as we would expect.  World Bank lending remains positive and
significant as does per capita GDP.  Arms imports continue to enter with a strongly significant
negative coefficient.  The sign on ethnolinguistic fractionalization switches to negative but
remains insignificant.  The CFA effect is strengthened while the Central American effect
becomes insignificant.
26The reduced sample size is driven by limited coverage of EDA data.  The only publically
available EDA data for World Bank lending are from BD who use 4 year averages.  Although this can be
lined up approximately with the once every five year FGR index, the coverage is limited.  This yields
similar results to those given above but the sample is limited to 44 countries with 125 observations for
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Column 4 is included for comparison with Column 3.  The World Bank variable is
replaced with other aid.  While World Bank disbursements entered positively and significantly,
the coefficient for other aid is somewhat smaller and not statistically significant.  Other
coefficient estimates are largely unchanged.
Column 5 extends this by including both variables.  In this specification, neither
WBAIDit!1 nor AIDit!1 is individually significant but they are jointly significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, Column 6 estimates the dynamic panel.  The contrast between the two source of aid is
much starker with an increase in the size and statistical significance of the coefficient on the
World Bank variable.  The coefficient on other aid decreases and remains statistically
insignificant.
To what extent does the above pattern reflect a bilateral/multilateral split?  The non-
World Bank variable is the appropriate control to use when examining the influence of the World
Bank.  But it combines multilateral and bilateral aid agencies.  Taken as a whole, does aid from
multilateral agencies (60% of which comes from non-World Bank sources) reduce the level of
regulation or is the World Bank unique in this regard?  Table 4 addresses this question by
repeating the fixed effects estimates (AID 5, WB 6, and FGR 6) but dividing disbursement data
into multilateral and bilateral rather than World Bank and other.  In addition, the right side of the
table gives results using effective development assistance (EDA) data for bilateral and
multilateral aid.26  This may be useful for comparison to other research done using EDA
the allocation equations and 37 countries with 76 observations for the regulation equation.




[Table 4 about here]
In the first estimation in Table 4 (BAID), the dependent variable is bilateral aid (i.e., the
log of real bilateral aid disbursements as a share of recipient country real GDP).  The estimated
coefficient for FGRit is positive but small and statistically insignificant indicating that the
regulatory environment is not an important determinant of bilateral aid flows.  Aid from
multilateral sources and past bilateral aid are both positively and significantly related to current
bilateral aid.  As before, GDP per capita is negative and significant, consistent with some degree
of needed-based allocation.  In a change from the previous estimation results, the bias against
large countries is not evident though this needs to be interpreted in light of the country fixed
effects.27  As in Table 1’s AID 5, arms imports do not enter significantly in the fixed effects
specification.
Switching to effective development assistance data (BEDA, the right side of Table 4), the
only qualitative difference in the estimation is the positive and significant coefficient for GDP
per capita.  One explanation for this is substantial bilateral loan aid directed toward low income
countries, (e.g., Japanese aid) together with substantial bilateral grant aid directed toward middle
income countries (e.g., U.S. aid).  In any event, this result is not primarily due to fixed effects or
the reduced sample.  The key point to note is that regulation is an insignificant factor in bilateral
aid allocation in both regressions.
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The second set of regressions in Table 4 (MAID and MEDA) examine multilateral aid. 
An interesting difference is immediately apparent.  Whether using standard or EDA measures,
the level of regulation appears to be a significant factor in the allocation process for multilateral
agencies as a whole.  A one point increase in the “freedom from regulation” index is associated
with a 0.12% increase in the ratio of multilateral disbursements to GDP and a slightly larger
0.16% increase in the ratio of multilateral EDA disbursements to GDP.  As before, both current
bilateral disbursements and previous multilateral disbursements have a significant link to current
multilateral disbursements.  Consistent with the previous aid literature, multilateral aid, whether
measured in traditional or EDA terms, reflects recipient need more consistently than bilateral aid. 
The bias against large countries is not significant when using EDA data though, again, this must
be interpreted in the context of country fixed effects.
The last set of regressions are for the regulation equation with aid divided into bilateral
(BAIDit!1) and multilateral (MAIDit!1) on the left and EDA divided into bilateral (BEDAit!1) and
multilateral (MEDAit!1) on the right.  Comparing the results to those in the last column of Table
3 (FGR 6), there is evident similarity in the impact on regulation of funds from the World Bank
and other multilateral agencies.  Thus, aid from the World Bank, like other multilateral aid,
appears to reduce the level of regulation in recipient countries while bilateral aid has no impact.
V.  Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate over governance and aid by using panel data to
examine links between aid flows and the level of regulation in recipient countries.  As the World
Bank’s 2004/2005 World Development Report illustrates, government regulation is an important
component in the governance debate both for donors and for developing countries:
There is huge scope in most countries for improving regulation and taxation
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without compromising broader social interests. Too often, governments pursue
approaches that fail to meet the intended social objective, yet harm the investment
climate. How? By imposing unnecessary costs, by increasing uncertainty and
risks, and by erecting unjustified barriers to competition.  (World Bank, 2004, 95)
Indeed, deregulation is a central component of policy reforms advocated and supported by the
major international development agencies.  The World Bank does acknowledge an important role
for appropriate regulation:  “Sound regulation addresses market failures that inhibit productive
investment and reconciles the interests of firms with those of society” (World Bank, 2004, 95). 
But substantially more focus is on inappropriate regulation.  The WDR points to three primary
regulatory costs: 1) compliance; 2) uncertainty; and 3) barriers to competition.  These drive firms
into the informal sector, create an environment for corruption, and perpetuate unproductive
monopolies.  One of the main thrusts of the WDR is the need to reduce the regulatory burden to
promote private investment which the World Bank sees as the engine of both growth and poverty
reduction.
“Knowledge bank” notwithstanding, well-written reports on their own are unlikely to
alter entrenched practices in developing countries.  Actual implementation of such reforms
depends on a better understanding of the multiple links between aid and regulation.  There are
reasons to expect a complex relationship between aid flows and the regulatory environment in
recipient countries.   This paper is an effort to delve into those relationships empirically, allowing
for bidirectional links as well as differences between groups of donors, namely the World Bank,
multilateral agencies, and bilateral donors.
The estimated aid allocation equations indicate that the level of regulation in a recipient
country generally is not considered by bilateral donors.  Multilateral agencies as a group do show
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a preference for good regulatory environments though this is not as a significant factor for the
World Bank in the equations estimated.  Turning to the impact of aid on the level of regulation,
both overall multilateral aid and World Bank lending have an apparent linked to deregulation.  In
contrast, bilateral aid has no apparent impact on regulation.
The most direct interpretation of these results is that World Bank conditionality has been
effective at promoting deregulation.  This contrasts with more general research on World Bank
structural adjustment efforts where lax enforcement of conditions results in little improvement in
recipient behavior (e.g., Mosley et al., 1995).  It may be that the leverage of conditionality on and
the resources to provide support for deregulation have been more effective than for other aspects
of structural adjustment.  The finding that World Bank and multilateral aid are more effective
than bilateral aid is, however, consistent with much of the aid literature.
While coming from a very different angle, this work reenforces the central message of
Easterly et al. (2004) that the empirical basis for selectivity remains tenuous.  The case for
selectively allocating aid to countries that have already undertaken reforms–the current direction
of the World Bank and the core of President Bush’s $5 billion Millennium Challenge Account
aid initiative–rests on claims that recipient government policy has not been responsive to aid and
that aid only promotes growth and reduces poverty in good policy environments.  Indeed, the
presupposition is not simply that aid has not induced policy reform but that aid cannot induce
policy reform.  Rather than looking to restructure aid institutions and instruments to improve
aid’s ability to directly promote good governance (through enforced conditions, appropriate
technical assistance, channeling more aid through multilateral agencies), the selectivity argument
favors abandoning the effort entirely.  The evidence presented here that aid from the World Bank
and other multilateral agencies can promote deregulation provides an important counter example,
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one that argues for improving the practice of aid rather than effectively abandoning the project.
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Table 1:  Aid Allocation Equation
Dependent variable: log of Aid excluding World Bank funds (AIDit)
AID 1 AID 2 AID 3 AID 4 AID 5
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGRit 0.028 0.40 0.003 0.09 -0.002 -0.07 0.062 1.33
WBAIDit 0.281 6.10** 0.258 6.10**
AIDit!1 0.613 8.10** 0.541 7.25** 0.179 2.85**
AIDrepayit!1 0.015 0.42 -0.024 -0.63 -0.088 -1.94*
GDP_CAPit -0.906 -9.53** -0.914 -9.30** -0.337 -3.78** -0.185 -2.33** -0.501 -3.30**
POPit -0.436 -9.12** -0.432 -8.87** -0.162 -4.62** -0.149 -5.07** -1.204 -2.96**
ARMSit!1 3.022 3.78** 3.124 3.56** 1.582 4.41** 1.544 4.66** 0.498 0.84
SSAi -0.117 -0.65 -0.112 -0.63 -0.026 -0.33 0.005 0.07
EASIAi -0.042 -0.30 -0.046 -0.33 -0.095 -1.04 -0.036 -0.43
EGYPTi 0.437 3.28** 0.432 3.10** -0.128 -1.56 0.184 1.85*
CENTAMi 0.029 0.12 0.014 0.05 0.055 0.65 0.098 1.35
ISRAELi 1.349 7.45** 1.401 7.21** 0.674 4.98** 0.766 5.66**
N 367 367 367 367 367
n 80 80 80 80 80
T 7 7 7 7 7
R-sq 0.742 0.743 0.850 0.876 0.545
within 0.409
between 0.607
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors.
*=10% significance level; **=5% significance level.
Aid variables (AID, WBAID, AIDrepay) measured as log of the 5 year average of real gross
disbursements as a share of the recipient’s real GDP.  All specifications include period dummies.
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Table 2:  World Bank Allocation Equation
Dependent variable: log of World Bank disbursements (WBAIDit)
WB 1 WB 2 WB 3 WB 4 WB 5 WB 6 WB 7
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGRit 0.013 0.20 -0.056 -1.12 -0.018 -0.41 -0.029 -0.69 0.097 1.59 0.105 1.58
AIDit 0.447 6.92 ** 0.303 5.02 ** 0.453 6.12 ** 0.341 1.32
WBAIDit!1 0.356 5.28 ** 0.265 4.50 ** 0.295 4.57 ** 0.109 2.61 ** 0.116 2.65 **
WBrepayit!1 0.027 1.56 0.027 1.65 0.027 1.69 * -0.011 -0.44 -0.013 -0.51
GDP_CAPit -0.815 -8.06 ** -0.819 -7.83 ** -0.569 -6.38 ** -0.217 -2.55 ** -0.328 -5.22 ** -0.893 -4.77 ** -1.027 -4.03 **
POPit -0.193 -4.35 ** -0.191 -4.23 ** -0.123 -3.38 ** 0.056 1.44 0.427 0.81
SSAi -0.165 -0.85 -0.163 -0.84 -0.138 -1.07 -0.058 -0.51 -0.081 -0.82
EASIAi -0.195 -1.46 -0.198 -1.45 -0.217 -1.96 ** -0.161 -1.74 * -0.182 -1.94 *
EGYPTi -0.747 -7.46 ** -0.745 -7.40 ** -0.644 -8.38 ** -0.977 -11.24 ** -0.870 -11.31 **
CENTAMi -0.157 -0.61 -0.164 -0.63 0.008 0.04 -0.055 -0.40 -0.032 -0.22
ISRAELi 0.148 1.07 0.175 0.96 -0.234 -1.50 -0.773 -4.92 ** -0.598 -4.28 **
N 367 367 367 367 367 367 367
n 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
T 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
R-sq 0.5309 0.5309 0.6405 0.7053 0.6985 0.3826 0.5843
within 0.4191 0.4138
between 0.3962 0.6734
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV FE IV&FE
t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors.
*=10% significance level; **=5% significance level.
Aid variables (AID, WBAID, WBrepay) are measured as the log of the 5 year average of gross real disbursements as a share of real GDP. 
All specifications include period dummies.
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Table 3:  Regulation Equation
Dependent variable: Freedom from Government Regulation (FGRit)
FGR 1 FGR 2 FGR 3 FGR 4 FGR 5 FGR 6
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
AIDit!1 0.052 1.06 0.021 0.36 A -0.025 -0.27
WBAIDit!1 0.195 2.62 ** 0.079 2.10 ** 0.067 1.37 0.137 2.18 **
FGRit!1 0.664 13.52 ** 0.665 12.78 ** 0.662 13.00 ** 0.217 3.41 **
GDP_CAPit!1 0.270 2.17 ** 0.374 2.89 ** 0.097 2.08 ** 0.078 1.33 0.102 1.97  * 0.107 0.55
ARMSit!1 -4.537 -5.40 ** -4.307 -5.20 ** -1.463 -3.93 ** -1.724 -4.64 ** -1.549 -3.88 ** 0.127 0.14
ETHNICi 0.147 0.43 0.180 0.53 -0.046 -0.37 -0.040 -0.32 -0.037 -0.29
CFAi -0.391 -1.89 * -0.397 -1.86 * -0.272 -3.62 ** -0.297 -3.60 ** -0.283 -3.40 **
SSAi 0.006 0.02 -0.050 -0.19 -0.132 -1.40 -0.139 -1.39 -0.142 -1.39
EASIAi 0.037 0.13 0.093 0.35 0.092 0.93 0.090 0.96 0.097 1.00
EGYPTi 0.178 0.83 0.273 1.36 0.119 1.66 0.069 0.98 0.112 1.44
CENTAMi 0.726 3.33 ** 0.711 3.48 ** 0.190 1.46 0.152 1.22 0.176 1.32
N 376 376 310 310 310 310
n 74 74 74 74 74 74
T 7 7 6 6 6 6
R-sq 0.280 0.304 0.681 0.679 0.681 0.534
within 0.178
between 0.825
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
t-statistics and significance levels computed with robust standard errors.  *=10% significance level; **=5% significance level.
Aid variables (AID, WBAID) are measured as the log of the 5 year average of gross real disbursements as a share of real GDP.
All specifications include period dummies.
AWe can reject the joint hypothesis that AIDit!1=0 and WBAIDit!1=0 at the 95% confidence level.
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Table 4:  Fixed Effects Estimates using Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
BAID BEDA
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGRit 0.041 0.75 FGRit 0.027 0.25
MAIDit 0.159 2.70 ** MEDAit 0.362 3.81 **
BAIDit!1 0.162 2.75 ** BEDAit!1 0.220 2.48 **
GDP_CAPit -0.393 -2.21 ** GDP_CAPit 1.791 4.40 **
POPit 0.239 0.50 POPit 1.034 0.83








Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
FGRit 0.125 2.34 ** FGRit 0.162 2.00 **
BAIDit 0.147 2.50 ** BEDAit 0.175 2.90 **
MAIDit!1 0.105 1.73 * MEDAit!1 0.199 2.29 **
GDP_CAPit -1.137 -6.86 ** GDP_CAPit -1.793 -5.73 **







FGR 7 FGR 8
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
BAIDit!1 -0.032 -0.41 BEDAit!1 0.065 1.35
MAIDit!1 0.194 2.29 ** MEDAit!1 0.069 1.15
FGRit!1 -0.15 3.31 ** FGRit!1 0.28 4.25 **
GDP_CAPit!1 0.136 0.68 GDP_CAPit!1 -0.194 -0.85







*=10% significance level; **=5% significance level.
Aid variables (BAID, MAID, BEDA, MEDA) are measured as the log of the 5 year average of gross
real disbursements as a share of real GDP.  All specifications include period dummies.
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Appendix
Table A1:  Sample Coverage
Country Coverage Periods Country Coverage Periods
ALGERIA 1990 2000 3
ARGENTINA 1970 2000 7
BANGLADESH 1975 2000 6
BARBADOS 1975 2000 6
BELIZE 1985 2000 4
BEN IN 1980 2000 5
BOLIVIA 1980 2000 4
BOTSWANA 1980 1995 4
BRAZIL 1970 2000 7
BULGARIA 1990 2000 3
BURUNDI 1975 2000 6
CAMEROON 1980 2000 5
CENTRAL AFR.R. 1985 1995 3
CHAD 1985 2000 4
CHILE 1975 2000 6
CHINA 1980 2000 5
COLOM BIA 1980 2000 5
CONGO 1980 2000 5
COSTA RICA 1975 2000 6
CYPRUS 1975 1990 4
CZECH REPUB LIC 1995 1995 1
DOMINICAN REP. 1980 2000 5
ECUADOR 1980 2000 5
EGYPT 1980 2000 5
EL SALVADOR 1985 2000 4
FIJI 1975 1995 5
GABON 1980 2000 5
GHANA 1975 2000 6
GUATEMALA 1970 2000 7
GUINEA-BISSAU 1990 2000 3
GUYANA 1995 1995 1
HAITI 1990 1995 2
HONDURAS 1980 2000 5
HUNGARY 1990 2000 3
INDIA 1970 2000 7
INDONESIA 1970 2000 7
IRAN 1980 2000 4
ISRAEL 1970 1980 3
JAMAICA 1980 2000 5
JORDAN 1970 2000 7
KENYA 1970 2000 7
KOREA, REP. 1975 2000 6
MADAGASCAR 1970 2000 6
MALAWI 1975 2000 6
MALAYSIA 1970 2000 7
MALI 1975 2000 6
MAURITIUS 1975 2000 6
MEXICO 1975 2000 6
MOROCCO 1980 2000 5
NAM IBIA 1995 1995 1
NEPAL 1980 2000 5
NICARAGUA 1985 1995 3
NIGER 1975 2000 6
NIGERIA 1975 2000 6
OMAN 1995 1995 1
PAKISTAN 1970 2000 7
PANAMA 1975 2000 6
PAPUA N.GUINEA 1980 1995 4
PARAGUAY 1990 2000 3
PERU 1980 2000 5
PHILIPPINES 1975 2000 6
POLAND 1990 2000 3
ROM ANIA 1990 2000 3
RUSSIA 1995 2000 2
RWANDA 1975 2000 6
SENEGAL 1980 2000 5
SIERRA LEONE 1975 1995 5
SINGAPORE 1970 1980 3
SOUTH AFRICA 1995 2000 2
SRI LANKA 1980 2000 5
SYRIA 1970 2000 5
TAN ZANIA 1970 2000 7
THAILAND 1970 2000 7
TOGO 1980 2000 5
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 1975 2000 6
TUNISIA 1970 2000 7
TURKEY 1975 2000 6
UGANDA 1975 2000 6
URUGUAY 1980 2000 5
VENEZU ELA 1970 2000 7
ZAIRE 1970 1990 5
ZAMBIA 1975 2000 6
ZIMBABWE 1980 2000 5
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Table A2:  Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max N Units/Scale
AIDit 0.390 0.463 1.159 -3.091 3.091 407 log % of GDP
AIDrepayit!1 -1.384 -1.340 1.144 -6.793 1.803 397 log % of GDP
WBAIDit -1.494 -1.297 1.313 -8.915 0.799 407 log % of GDP
WBrepayit!1 -2.858 -2.581 1.793 -18.310 0.044 380 log % of GDP
BAIDit -0.025 0.098 1.275 -3.112 3.057 407 log % of GDP
BEDAit -1.125 -0.932 1.287 -8.209 2.047 304 log % of GDP
MAIDit -0.426 -0.338 1.123 -5.463 2.107 407 log % of GDP
MEDAit -0.619 -0.523 1.103 -7.133 3.052 310 log % of GDP
FGRit 5.256 5.254 0.991 2.473 7.278 407 0 to 10
GDP_CAPit 7.571 7.646 0.840 5.843 9.329 407 log of 1996 US $
POPit 16.216 16.127 1.641 12.021 20.956 407 log
ARMSit!1 0.038 0.014 0.076 0 0.831 407 % of imports
ETHNICi 0.460 0.530 0.301 0 0.930 384 0 to 1
CFAi 0.120 0 0.326 0 1 407 indicator
SSAi 0.349 0 0.477 0 1 407 indicator
EASIAi 0.101 0 0.301 0 1 407 indicator
CENTAMi 0.086 0 0.281 0 1 407 indicator
Table A3:  Simple Correlations
AIDit WBAIDit FGRit GDP_CAPit POPit ARMSit!1 ETHNICi CFAi SSAi EASIAi
WBAIDit 0.645
FGRit -0.077 -0.033
GDP_CAPit -0.564 -0.540 0.303
POPit -0.523 -0.152 -0.291 -0.114
ARMSit!1 0.194 -0.008 -0.349 -0.045 0.051
ETHNICi 0.172 0.192 -0.078 -0.465 0.137 -0.054
CFAi 0.342 0.211 -0.171 -0.327 -0.231 -0.044 0.348
SSAi 0.510 0.394 -0.155 -0.665 -0.218 -0.082 0.508 0.511
EASIAi -0.339 -0.180 0.021 0.136 0.356 -0.091 0.068 -0.132 -0.259
CENTAMi 0.098 -0.021 0.222 0.068 -0.198 0.018 -0.180 -0.113 -0.222 -0.103
N=384
